University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
College of Business Faculty Publications

Business, College of

March 1992

Overlap of Organizations: Corporate Transorganization and
Veblen's Thesis on Higher Education
F. Gregory Hayden
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, ghayden1@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cbafacpub
Part of the Business Commons

Hayden, F. Gregory, "Overlap of Organizations: Corporate Transorganization and Veblen's Thesis on Higher
Education" (1992). College of Business Faculty Publications. 46.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cbafacpub/46

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business, College of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Business Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

[Includes “Erratum” from pp. 1257–1258.]

~ei

JOURNAL OF ECONOMlC ISSUET
Vd.XXW No. I hfawb 1992

Overlap of Organizations:
Corporate Transorganization and
Veblen's Thesis on Higher Education
F. Gregory Hayden
and
Kurt Stephenson

This article is built upon the legacy fiom three of Thorstein Veblen's
theories. The first may be best summarized by Martin Gellen who
wrote:

Veblen was the first economist to recognize that management was an important factor of production in modem business enterprise, and nowhere
was this more evident than in the rise of the large corporation. .These
new enterprises took over fiom the market the coodnation and integration of the flow of goods and services all the way fiom the production of
the raw materials through the several processes of production to the sale
of the ultimate consumer. Veblen perceived correctly that administered production by means of large corporations would eventually spread
throughout most of the economy [Gellen 1984, pp. 82-83].
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The second is his observation that the economy should be described
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as a network of sequential events and decisions [Veblen 18981. Veblen's
theory on the decisionmaking apparatus of higher education (Veblen
1957, which will be summarized below, is the third theoretical leg of
the surveyor's tripod used for the observations in this article.
t
,
to
The purpose of this research is to accomplish the following: h
extend the conceptual framework of transorganizational research
through the Social Fabric Matrix and Digraph [Hayden 1982a and
1982bl. The literature on transorganizational research is found under
topics such as interorganizational organization in sociology, directorship interlocks in economics, and organizational structure in management studies. Second, to apply the extended framework to corporate

translocks in the state of Nebraska. Consistent with the work of Bert
M. Evans [Evans 19801and John R. Munkirs [Munkirs19851,this see
tion will articulate the integration of Nebraska's centrally coordinated
planning system that results from the integration of private corporations. The articulation will include the determination of what Evans
called the "dominant core" corporations-what Munkirs designated
the "central planning core" (CPC). Third, the Nebraska CPC (NCPC)
data base is used in conjunction with Veblen's thesis on decisionmaking in higher education, to analyze the relationship between the NCPC
and the University of Nebraska.
OverlapAmong Organhtions

As the social sciences have attempted to move beyond self-actional
and interactional modeling to transactional modeling, an important
concern has been how to model the overlap or relationshipsamong organizations. Although the prefix "inter" is a misnomer in a transactional world, this literature is sometimes referred to as dealing with
"interorganizational organizations." Those employing self-actionmodels assumed that the behavior of entities or agents is determined by
inner drives, or motives, or rational utility calculations. With interactional (inter means between) models, it was assumed that the actions
and reactions among entities determine reality. Most interaction models followed the equilibrium models of Newtonian physics, where entities are balanced against each other, the antiquated model of the
interaction and balance between supply and demand is an example.
Transactional (trans means across) models are based on the more recent knowledge that proscriptive and prescriptive criteria, customs,
and control organizations are across and above the entities and guide
the behavior of those entities in non-isomorphic fields. In a transac-
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tional, or holistic setting, the social organizations as well as their integration linkages (connectives, locks) are created and maintained by
the actions, rules, and customs that are across the particular entities of
the system. Reality is not disintegrated; it is scientists who reduce the
world to disintegrated units with self-actionaland interactional models.
More recently, the scientific job has been discovering how to model
transactional systems and holistic networks.
The psychologist, Arthur Bentley, and the economist, John R Commons, were two early scholars who developed applied transactional
analysis. John R. Commons defined transactions as the smallest economic unit that can be regularly observed for scientificpuposes. Thus,
when he observed the transaction of buying and selling, it was not to
give extraordinary meaning to the price artifact, but rather to take account of judicial, social, psychological, political, economic, energy, and
natural components both across and determining the transaction of
buying and selling [Commons 19681.
SociologistsHuseyin Leblebici and Gerald Salancik, in their analysis
of the Chicago Board of Trade, began with Commons's concepts. Their
study reports how stability of transactions is achieved through transorganizational working rules. They found that "from the view of a theory
of organization, this implies that the exchange transactions observed
in any interorganizational field are not solely under the control and discretion of exchange partners themselves, but are the product of collective rule making which produces order out of conflict and mutuality"
[Leblebici and !hlancik 1982, p. 2411. Commons found that for transactions to proceed, there must be a collective guarantor to the transaction. "Because of this need for the guarantor, a transaction is not a
result of the exchange between two parties,. but rather the result of
the collective powers" Dblebici and Salancik 1982, p. 2291.
The modeling of the transactionalrelationshipsamong organizations
can by guided by a number of different methodological approaches.
The institutionalist approach is one of overlap of the process and decisionmaking of related organizations. The environment around any
organization is itself made up of other organizations. Thus,the overlap
itself is an institutional entity and of scientific interest to thle institutional researcher [See: Bush 1983and 1987. The organizations are not
separate; they are provided with functions, criteria, and decisionmakers that integrate the overlapping organizations. The srnrcture and process of each organization is part of other organizations. In this article,
the institutional and transactional approach will be used.
Consistent with such utilization, terms to designate linkages, locks,

..

56

F. Gregory Hayden and Kurt Stephenson

deliveries, and connectiveswill, when prefixed, be prefixed with "transw
rather than "interwin order to be consistent with transactional analysis.
The etymology and specification of the prefix "inter" is inconsistent
with the manner and means through which relations among organizations are established and maintained. The distinction is important with
regard to policy concerns. If relationships among organizations were
really limited and determined by those organizations, they would be
immune to public policy. If it is, however, understood and designated
that the functioning of relationships depends on the transactional beliefs, criteria, customs, policies, laws, and rules that exist across and
outside the particular organizational transaction, then it is possible to
redesign those transactions through public policy. As John Dewey and
Arthur Bentley stated, "naming does things. It states. To state, it must
both conjoin and disjoin, identify as distinct and identifyas co~ected"
[Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 1331. If the naming is inconsistent with
the identification of what is known, the misdesigdon will encourage
the development of policy inconsistent with scientific findings.
Relevant Corporate TransorganizationalLiterature

The "interorganizational organizationwliterature in sociology dates
back to at least the 1800s, and includes studies on fhmilies, corporations, markets, government agencies, military confederations, classes
and so forth. An important part of that literature deals with the overlap
of corporations, especially the exchange of directors among corporate
boards. What has been missing in such studies, according to Charles J.
Fombrun, has been an integrated transactional, or holistic, approac3
for understanding and modeling the MIsociostructure "as h s struggle to manage their common fate" pombrun 1986, p. 41 11.
In his book, The Transformation of American Capitalism, John
Munkirs argues, consistent with Evans, that most of the production and
distribution decisions in the American economy are not made by the
invisible hand of the market, but by a small number of closely linked
corporations wunkirs 19851. Munkirs traces the evolution of the
American economy from the birth of industrial trusts after the Civil
War to the present day economy, dominated by "centralized private
sector planning" (CPSP).At the center of the CPSP process is a small
number of large banks and insurance corporations, which Munkirs labels the "central planning core" (CPC). The CPC possesses an impressive array of both formal and informal planning instruments with
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which to coordinate and direct economic activity. Formal planning instruments available to the CPC include shared stock and debt ownership and overlapping boards of directors. Informal planning
instruments, which serve as a network of informational conduits
among CPC corporations, include legal and financial services such as
shared trustees, registrars, and transfer agents. The CPC delivers information and direction through these collective planning instruments to
corporations in vital industrial, transportation, and retail sectors of the
economy. What emerges fiom this private centrally planned process is
a technologically, financially, and administratively overlapping group
of large corporations.
Munkirs developed and organized a substantial data base for his
book. His empirical work leads us to a new theory of the h.
The
locus of a corporation's decisionmaking in the modem economy is not
based on marginal cost and revenue considerationsof an independent
competitive h as explained by Atfied Marshall., it is not based on
the mutual dependence recognized considerationsof an oligopoly firm
as explained by Edward Chamberlin; and it is not the result of the team
of technocrats in the large corporation as emphasized by John Galbraith. According to Munkirs, the locus of decisionmaking is the reoognized planning arrangements undertalcen and enforced jointly by
overlappinggoverning boards and other planning instruments of global
corporations.
Munkirs demonstratesempirically how in one industry after another
governing boards are connected to the CPC and to other governing
boards through different kinds of overlaps. Through his elaboration of
a central planning tableau, he shows how the CPC has placed itself in
a position to plan for more than 100 of the largest U.S.corporations.
The tableau demonstrates:
how firms in a given industry. . are technologically, financially,
and administratively interdependent;
how each of several industries. .are technologically, financially,
and administratively interdependent;and
how over the years, a series of planning instruments have evolved
that both allow and indeed, to some extent, necessitate regional, national, and international centralized private sector planning [Munkirs
1985, p. 51.
Munkirs's work leaves us with a general theory regarding the impor,tanceof centralized patterns in organizational overlap, and with methods to meet Fombrun's call for modeling the complex constructs of full

.
.
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sociostmctures. Our goal is to refine the concept of organizational overlap, and to explain methods which can be used to identi6 and derive
centralized patterns of overlap.
Overlap and Reachability Concepts

Conceptually, the concern is with the overlapping sets that define the
network and delivery process. This can be explained with the use of the
simple digraph (directed graph) in F ' i 1. Assume that E,F,G,H, and
I are five organizations-five different corporations in this case. Corporations can make various kinds of deliveries to each other. In this
case we will be concerned with the delivery of directors.The deliveries

among the organizations, for example djrectors D, through D,in Figure
1, are an important part of their transorganizational relationships. The
importance, or central position, of any corporation would depend on
the number of Werent kinds of transorganizational sets in which the
corporation is involved, and on the number of deliveries within each
set. If two corporationseach send one director to the other's board, the
degree of overlap would be less than if the same corporations shared
four directors.

Figure 1 . Organization Overlap and Reachability Digraph

We are specifyingthree different kinds of organizational overlap sets.
They are primary, secondary, and tertiary sets, which are demonstrated
in Figure 1 with the use of dotted lines to outline the different sets.
Primary Overlap: A primary corporate translock 0
is outlined in
Figure 1 with the rectangle around E and F. (Appendix A contains a
glossary of acronyms and symbols for the reader's convenience.) As in-
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dicated, director D, serves on the boards of corporations E and F. Corporation E is involved in one PCT with F and has one primary director
translock (PDT). The PDT indicates the delivery level (number delivered). Although not outlined by a dotted line in Figure 1, other FXX
sets include those between G and F, F and H, and H and I. Corporation
G, for example, has one PCT and three PDTs with corporation F. With
a primary overlap, the directors on the two governing boards meet together at each other's board meetings to plan together for the two corporations involved.
Secondary Overlap: A secondary corporate translock (SCT) is outlined in Figure 1 by a set (enclosed by a triangle) which includes corporations F,H, and I. Corporation I has a SCT with corporation F
through corporation H. This example of a SCT has three secondary director translocks (SDTs), which are D, D,, and D, Other SCT sets in
Figure 1 include E with G and G with H. With a secondary overlap,
the directors ox! the two governing boards are still meeting together
face-to-fkce in planning sessions on a third governing board, which has
an overlapping interest in the two SCT corporations. There are direct
planning relationships between the two companies, and the directors
involved have direct face-to-h reachability with regird to decisions
in a deliberative setting.
Tertiary Overlap: A tertiary corporate translock (
T
o
is outlined in
Figure 1 by a dotted line set that includes corporations E,F,H, and I.
Corporation E has a TCT with corporation I through corporation F and
H. This example of a TCT has four tertiary director translocks (TDTs).
They are Dj, D, D, and D7. Unlike primary and secondary corporate
overlaps, there are not necessarily direct &ce-to-face relationships at a
governing board meeting between the directors fiom E and I. To use
the example in Figure 1, after D, and D, meet at corporation F, delib
erative decisions and plans, if they are to include corporation I, must
take place at the board meeting of corporation H. E has reachability to
I, but it can be once removed fiom direct fce-to-f8ce planning deliberations, as indicated in Figure 1. Another TCT in Figure 1 is G with
I though F and H, with six TDTs. The TDTs are Dj, D, D, and D,
Figure 1 is, of course, too limited to portray all the various sets of
corporations in a real world context. We can observe fiom F i i 1,
however, that corporation F is a central organbation in the process network. It is involved in more organizational overlap sets, and has more
reachability to other corporations, and a greater level of deliveries, in
terms of directors, than any other corporation. It lies in the intersection
of all three sets.
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Extension with the Social Matrix and Digraph

The Social Fabric Matrix (SFM)can be used to extend the organhation overlap concepts and to apply the concepts to the complex and
redundant overlaps of the real world. To explain this application of the
SFM, corporations A, B, C, J, and K are arrayed along both sides of
the matrix in Figure 2, and the delivery of directors from one corporation to another corporation is indicated in the cells. For example, corporation A delivers its board member X to the board of corporation B,
and member Z to corporation J. As another example, C delivers Y to
B, Z to J, and two members, N and M are sent to K The rows and
columns can be aggregated as in Figure 2, and thus the various overlaps
defined above are specified in the matrix as follows:

Flgure 2. Sociaf Fabric MoMx of Corporale Direct Deliveries.

PCP The total PCT's a corporation has with other corporations is
the total number of cells with entries in the corporation's row in the
SFM. For example, the row total for cell entries for corporation C is 3.
PDT: The total PDTs involved in a corporations PCTs is the total
number of directors in a corporations row. For example, the row total
for directors for corporation C is 4.
SCP The total SCTs a corporation has with other corporations is
the total number of cells with entries, less 1, in the column, for columns
with a corporation's director delivery to a FCT. For example, the total
SCTs for corporation A can be found by the aggregation of the cell entries of columns 2 and 4, less 1 for each column. Or, corporation A is
involved in 5 SCTs [(3-1)+(4-1)=5]. To find the SCTs for A, read
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across the row from left to right (as indicated with the directed dashed
line). In column 2, director X from A is serving on the board of B (a
PCT).If we read down, it will be discovered that corporations C and J
also deliver Y and N respectively to the board of B. Thus,A has a SCT
with C and another with J through B. Because B is the direct PCT
through which the SCTs with C and J are accomplished, it is not
counted in the total. A similar SCT case exists in column 4.
SDR The total SDTs participating in a corporation's STCs is the total number of directors in the column that contains a corporation's delivery of directors to a PCT.For example, the total SDT for corporation
A can be found by the aggregation of the cell entries of columns 2 and
4, for a total of 7. To find the SDT total for A, read across the row fiom
left to right. In column 2, director X serves on the board of B. All of
the directors in column 2 are members of the SDT. A similar SDT case
exists in column 4, in which there are four SDTs.
TCT: The total TCTs to which a corporation belongs is the total
number of cells with entries, less 1, for rows in which there is a corporation with which the original corporation has an SCT. For example, the
total TCTs for corporation A can be found by the aggregation of the
cell entries, less 1, for each row, for rows 3 and 4. Or, stated differently,
corporation A participated in 5 T m s [(3-1)+(4-1)=5] through corporation B. To find a TCT for A, read across row 1 (still following the
directed dashed line) fiom left to right to a PTC (column 2), go down
that column to a S m , and then aggregate all the cell entries in that row
(row 3) minus 1. The 1 is subtracted in that row for the SCT through
which the TCT is formed. A similar TCT case exists for row 4. This
calculation would need to be repeated (not indicated by dashed lines
in Figure 2) for each SCT through corporation J in column 4 to obtain
the total number of TCTs for corporation A, or 5 TCTs [(3-l)+(3- 1)+
(2-1)=5]. Thus,the total TCTs for corporation A is 10, [5+5].
TDF The total TDTs are the total number of directors in the TCT
rows plus the number of directors in the PCT cell from which each TCT
originates. For example, the total for corporation A is 23. To find the
TCT total for A, read across the row fiom left to right. There is 1director in PCX cell (1,2). Reading down from cell (1,2), row 3 has 4 directors
plus the 1 director in cell (1,2). A similar process is followed for row 4.
Reading down fiom cell (1,4), row 2 has 3 directors plus the 1 director
in cell (1'4) fiom which the TCT in row 2 originates. A similar process
is followed for rows 3 and 5. Thus [(4+ 1) + (4+ 1) + (3+1) + (4+1) +
(3+1)] 23.
The matrix in Figure 2 is laid out in digraph format in Figure 3,

-
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which clarifies reachability and redundancy. By observing Figure 3, it
is more obvious that corporation A reached J through numerous channels-with a direct PCT, with a SCT through B, and with a TCT
through B and C. These redundant linkages enhance the opportunity
for the decisions and plans to be made conjointly and implemented
effectively. Numerous corporations govern in a manner that relies on
corporation J effectively maintaining the plan coordinated with corporation A, and the directors from those corporations who sit on the
governing board of J emphasize that reliance. These are redundant reinforcement channels. Equally important, all those corporations reach
A. Stated differently, A reaches itself indirectly through these linkages.
At first blush this statement may sound irrelevant. Yet, upon reflection,
it means that the directors delivered to A's board fiom other wrporations can remind A of A's original decisions and their reliance on the
original decisions, and thereby reinforce the plan that leads to continuity of the economic process. This planning transmission cycle is consistent with the institutional theory of cumulative circular causation.

Figure 3. Social Fabric Digraph of Corporate Director Deliveries

Nebraska Corgoatio~

'

To articulate the network process of organization overlap among private corporationsin Nebraska, we began by collecting for each corporation the names of directors and officers, the value of assets and sales,
and the names of the law firms and accounting firms used by each corporation.' After an arduous and lengthy search, such data were collected on 348 Nebraska corporations.
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Pattern of Nebraska Corporate Overlap

Early in the data collection process, it became apparent fiom casual
observation that there is considerable overlap among the governing
boards of Nebraska corporations. Computer assistance made it possible to select only corporations having at least one PCT. Next, to discover the pattern of the overlapping governing boards, the corporations
with at least one PCX were entered into a Social Fabric Matrix (as explained above). The list included 100 corporations, thus requiring a
matrix of 100 rows and 100 columns. The number of directors fiom
each corporation that serves on another board were entered into the
relevant matrix cells, and the PCTs, PDTs, SCTs, SDTs, TCTs, and
TDTs were aggregated in the type of matrix explained above and illustrated in Figure 2.2 The results of the aggregation, for those corporations with four or more PCTs, are rank ordered in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 1, along with the number of PDTs in column 3. There were 30
corporations with four or more PCTs. FirsTier Financial, the top
ranked in direct board connections, had 30 PCTs and 42 PDTs. This
means FirsTier had at least one of its directors serving on 30 other Nebraska corporation boards; and on the boards of other corporations,
FirsTier held 42 board positions.
In determining director deliveries among boards, board members of
subsidiary corporations were included as members of the parent corporation's board. This was one in order to not multiply the apparent
number of translocks of particular boards and members. Board mem-

bers fiom the parent company are often on the subsidiary board. We
did not consider that arrangement as constituting a separate corporate
overlap because these members all belong to the same corporation.
Had such internal deliveriesof board members been counted, the totals
in Table 1 would have multiplied considerably.
The ranking by the number of SCTs is given in columns 4 and 5 of
Table 1. The corporations with 30 or more SCTs are listed. Column 6
contains their corresponding number of SDTs. Of interest are the corporations that did not make the PCT and PDT list, which are included
in the SCT and SDT list. They are Farmers Mutual Insurance, Woodmen Accident and Life, Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., IBP, Mall
Corp.,and the Nebraska Farmer (all indicated with an asterisk in Table
1, column 4). These are all corporations which were connected with a
PCX to FirsTier. Any corporation with a FCT to FirsTier would automatically be involved with at least 29 SCTs. This allows us to see that
t eprominent
d
in the system witha corporation can be well ~ 0 ~ e ~and
out a large number of PCTs if its PCTs are with other central corporations. As an example, Mutual of Omaha has only three PCTs, but one
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is with FirsTier. The reverse of that situation can be seen with First
National of Nebraska, parent of First National-Omaha. First National
of Nebraska appears in column 1, but not in columns 4 and 7. It does
not have a PCT with FirsTier Financial or with other central corporations; thus, it does not generate enough SCTs to qualie for the list in
column 4.
The ranking by the number of TCI's appears in columns 7 and 8 of
Table 1. Those corporationswith 170or more TCI's are listed. Column
9 contains their correspondingnumber of TDTs. As with the SCT ranking, there are corporations in the top 26 with respect to the number of
TCTs that are not listed in columns 1 and 4 (as indicated by an asterisk). Of greater interest, the SFM allows us to discover the large number of other corporations that any corporation can reach on a tertiary
basis. For example, FirsTier with 30 PCTs, is involved in 447 tertiary
board overlaps and has 886 TDTs.
At this point in our analysis, it is apparent that Nebraska has a centralized private sector planning (CPSP)system similar to that found by
Munkirs for the national economy wunkirs 19851. Some differences
are also apparent. For those familiar with Munkirs's findings, one a p
parent difference is that the Nebraska system is more centralized than
the national system in the distribution of direct board of directors
translocks and in the board members involved in the translocks. Nebraska's PCTs and PDTs are both less equally distributed than at the
national level. However, the centricity of the system and reachability
within the system, rather than differences with the national system, are
the interests in this article.
Nebraska Central Planning Core

The criterion used to determine the corporations that make up the
Nebraska Central Planning Core (NCPC) is the degree of reachability
of a corporation to the dominant corporations at the center of the core
decision network. From Table 1, it is clear that FirsTier Financial, Lincoln Telecommunications, First Commerce Bmcshares, and Ameritas
Life Insurance are the top four corporations with the most connections
in PCT, SCT, and TCT categories. In addition, all four have a PCT
with the other three. Because these four corporations are the most
central, the other corporations in Table 1 are ranked with respect to
their reachability to these central corporations. Some corporations listed in Table 1 were deleted from consideration as a NCPC corporation
because of their relatively small size.3 In addition, some corporations, such as IBP and Pegler-Sysco, were deleted from consideration
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because it was the authors' assessment that the major decisions for
those corporations were made outside Nebraska. IBP is a subsidiary of
Occidental Petroleum and the national corporate headquarters of
Pegler-Sysco is in Houston, Texas.
The final list of corporations comprising the NCPC are in Table 2
along with the total number of various types of translock sets by which
each corporation reached the four leaders. For example, in the case of
Valmont, FirsTier is reached through a PCT, 5 SCTs and 17 TCTs.
After determining the connections to the four central corporations, the
lock sets are weighted by assigning each PCT a weight of 5, each SCT
the weight of 3, and each TCT the weight of 1.4 The total, determined
by multiplying the number of PCTs, SCTs, and TCTs by their respective weights, is found in the final column of Table 2. Using this manner
of determination, it was found, for example, that Crete Camer (with a
total of 112) has over two and one-half times the reachability to the
central corporations as Guarantee Mutual Life (with a total of 42). The
NCPC consists of four banks (FirsTier, First Commerce Bancshares,
Norwest Nebraska, and Union Bank and Trust); five insurance companies (Guarantee Mutual Life, Woodmen Accident and Life, Farmers
Mutual, Security Mutual Life, and Ameritas Life); one investment
holding corporation (Berkshire Hathaway), and five production corporations (Crete Camer, ConAgra, Peter Kiewit, Lincoln Telecommunications, and Valmont Industries).
Directorship deliveries among the NCPC corporations are indicated
in the NCPC Social Fabric Matrix contained in Figure 4, and in the
NCPC Social Fabric Digraph contained in Figure 5. The deliveries are
found by reading the SFM across ftom left to right. For example, as
indicated in row 1, FirsTier delivers 4 directors (4 PDT's) to Woodmen, 3 to ConAgra, 3 to Valmont, and so forth. The total PCTs for
each corporation within the core is found in column 16 and their total
PDTs within the core are found in column 17. By adding each column,
less one, where FirsTier has a PCT, the total SDTs in the core can be
determined for FirsTier. For example, in Column 14, the director delivered from FirsTier to Lincoln Telecommunications (cell 1,14) meets
with directors who also serve as directors of First Commerce Bane
shares, Ameritas Life, Woodmen, and so forth, because directors fiom
those corporations also serve on Lincoln Telecommunication's board.
To find the TDTs, as explained earlier in Figure 2, one would read left
and right from each SDT. For example, FirsTier's SDT in cell (3,14)
also allows FirsTier to reach Norwest Nebraska in cell (3,2) to provide
information and influence on a tertiary basis.
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The translock network among these central core corporations is easier to conceptualize by observing Figure 5. In Figure 5 the nodes are
the component corporations and the edges (lines) are the deliveries of
directors. Since the director delivery is in both directions, only one line
with an arrow on each end is used. For example, if two corporations,
such as FirsTier and First Commerce Bancshares, both have a director
serve on the other's board, that is indicated with one edge. Numbers
are used in Figure 5 to represent the director's names. That number
and the name to which it corresponds are found in Appendix B. The
names of directors are included in order that readers may correct us if
the public documents from which the data base is compiled are inac-

curate, and in order to allow others to complete a surname analysis.
These corporations exchange governing board members, plan together on each others' boards, and exchange information through direct
and indirect linkages and planning functions. Within the NCPC, 13 of
the 15 members deliver a president or CEO to other core corporations.
In addition, although the data base is not contained in this article, some
keep deposits with each other, serve as each others' agents, and own
each others' stock. Because these corporations are highly integrated, the
welfare of one affects the welfare of others. Thus, it is a system of mutual advantage recognized arrangements, to use Bert Evans's term,
through which they (legally and systematically)plan together. They do
not belong to a competitive system of decentralized, independent Eree
enterprise. They belong to a centralized private sector planning system,
to use John Munkirs's term, of which they are the central core members. We see that the NCPC is closely integrated in its decisionmaking
functions and is an information diffusion system. Through this network, and through their numerous overlaps with other Nebraska corporations (see Table I), these corporations can diffuse their plans across
the corporate board structure of the Nebraska economy.

Tke~ebraskuCPC and the Unimity of Nebrasku
Next we will use Thorstein Veblen's ideas relevant to university administration as a guide to relate the Nebraska CPC to the administration of the University of Nebraska. Veblen's relevant work on the
subject is his book, The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum
on the Conduct of Universitiesby Business Men [Veblen 19571. The subtitle is the important aspect for our purposes here. (Especially relevant
to the Nebraska case is the use of the word "Men.")5
Veblen found the maxims that guided the major universities of his
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day did not lead them to be in the senrice of science and scholarship,
but rather, the maxims that guided their conduct were those found in
the marketplace and the world of pecuniary gain. The reason their conduct was so directed was because the universities were dominated by
governing boards made up of businessmen and university presidents
with powem positions. Therefore, the "aims and methods of the
scholars and schools devoted to the higher learning" [Veblen 1957, p.
31 are found to be influenced by the "habitual pursuit of business in
modern times" [Veblen 1957, p. 31.
The university administrative apparatus reflected the seadarkation
of the United States by the substitutionof laymen for clergymen on the
governing boards. Veblen wrote, "the substitution is a substitution of
businessmen and politicians; which amounts to saying that it is a substitution of businessmen. So that the discretionary control in matters
of university policy now rests finally in the hands of businessmen"
[Veblen 1957, p. 461. He found that "poor men and men without large
experience in business a f b h are felt to have no place in these bodies"
[Veblen 1957, p. 471. The effective control of the university, according
to Veblen, "is exercised through the board's control of the budget"
[Veblen 1957, p. 581, because "the academic staffcan do little else than
what the specifications of the budget provide for. .." [Veblen 1957, p.
581. The power of the purse gives the governing boards the power to
establish the beliefs and criteria to guide the university, and "the fact
is that businessmen hold the plenary direction, and that business principles guide them in their management ofthe a&rirs ofthe higher learning. . ." [Veblen 1957, p. 571. The academic administrator is "vested
with somewhat autocratic powers" [Veblen 1957, p. 591 by the board
and "he is in effect responsible to the governing board alone" [Veblen
1957, p. 591 and therefore the mind set of the board; a mind set which
does not habitually look beyond the "interest of commercial gain and
the commonplacesof commercial routine and political bravado" [Veblen 1957, p. 1741.
Veblen found that business boards, as a rule, "will be carell to give
their general manager full discretion, and not to hamper him with too
close an accounting of the details of his administration, so long as he
shows gratifjing results. He must be a strong man; that is to say, a capable man of afkirs, tenacious and resourcell in turning the mews at
hand to account for this purpose, and easily content to let the end justify the means" [Veblen 1957, p. 661. The fierce campaign of aspirants
for executive office in universities tests their qwdiilcations against the
standards expected by the board, and tests their strength under pres-
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sure. "These boards are made up of well-to-do businessmen, with a penchant for popular notability; and the qualifications necessary to put in
evidence by aspirants for executive o5ce are such as will convince such
a board of their serviceability" [Veblen 1957, p. 1801. There are many
more candidates willing to serve such boards than positions available;
thus, the aspirant9strial under fire provides a process to prove his aggressiveness and strength.
In point of fact, here as in political office-seeking, the most
active factor that goes to decide the selection of the eventual incumbents
of oftice is a tenacious aggressive self-selection. With due, but by no means
large, allowance for exceptions, the incumbents are chosen fiom among a
self-selected body of candidates, each of whom has, in the common run
of cases, been resolutely in pursuit of such an oftioe for some appreciable
time, and has spent much time and endeavor on fitting himself for its duties. Commonly it is only after the aspirant has achieved a settled reputation of eligibility and a predilection for the office that he will finally secure
appointment [Veblen 1957, p. 1791.

This was the university decision model that Veblen observed at the
turn of the century for the major U.S. universities. Universities have,
of come, changed considerably since that time in some ways consistent
with, and, in other ways, in response to Veblen9ssuggestions and criticism. Veblen, however, was not modeling state universities. They were
, not the major universities early in this century.
The NCPCflU Social Fabric Matrix

As we saw above, the decisionmaking institutions of the corporate
-.businesscommunity have evolved to a new process since the time of
Veblen. We should also expect that the relationship between modem
state universities and the new business complex has also changed. Because the CPC is the dominant core of business decisions in the
centrally private sector planning system, we might expect that a university's connection with the business community would be through the
CPC.We will begin testing such a hypothesis by determining the relationships between the NCPC and the University of Nebraska (NU).
To outline the extent of such overlap, NU is added to the SFM of
the NCPC found in Figure 4 above. The new SFM with NU included
is found in Figure 6, and the digraph expressing the matrix of Figure
6, as a directed graph, is found in Figure 7. Included in the NU system
for 1988-1989 are the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UN-L),
the
the University of Nebraska
University of Nebraska-Omaha
Medical Center, and the University of Nebraska Foundation.

o),
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The delivery entries in Figure 6 are the same as in Figure 4 except
for the NU system, add@ as row 16 and column 16. The entries in row
16 are the deliveries made by NU to the NCPC corporations, and in
column 16 the entries are the deliveries made fiom the NCPC corporations to NU. The deliveries fiom NU to the corporations are designated by U, which indicates that those persons are in an important
decisionmaking position at the university. They a l l serve in two
capacities-as a university official and as a corporate director. This becomes clear as we explain the row cells in Column 16 in which there
are entries. They are as follows:
Matrix Cell
Row Cell (1.16)

Explanation ofDeliiwry

FirsTier delivers 11 directors to NU positions. Those positions an:
Chancellor of UN-L, V i a President of NU, Foundation Award Committee. Foundation Executive Committee, Foundation Administrative Committee, Foundation Development Committee, and eight of
FhTier's boarddirectors smre on the Foundation Board of Directors

Row Cell (2,16) Norwest Nebraska delivers three directorsto NU positions. Those positions are: V i a Chanallm of Un-L, Chancellor of Un-0, Via M&nt of NU, and two Foundation BODS.
Row Cell (3,16) Fmt Commerce Ban&livers four directors to NU positions.
Those positions an: Athletic Director, Dean of the College of Business, UN-L, Foundation Nominating Committee, and a NU Regent.
Row Cell (5,16) Ameritas Life delivers three directors to NU positions. Those positions an:Foundation Mministrative Committee. Foundation Award

Committee, Foundation Executive Committee, and three Foundation
BODS.
Row Cell (6,16) Guarantee Mutual delivers two directorsto NU positions. Those positions are: President of NU, Foundation Budget and F i a Committee, Foundation Executive Committee, and Foundation BOD.
Row Cell (7,16) Woodman Accident & Lifk &livers two directors to NU positions.
Those positions are: Foundation Award Committee, Chanallor
UN-L, V i a Pmident of NU, and two Foundation BODS.
Row Cell (8,16) M t y Mutual delivers a director to a NU position. That position is
Head Football Coach, UN-L
Row Cell (9,16) Fanners Mutual delivers two directors to NU positions. Those positions are: Foundation Budget and Fmce Committee, Foundation
Executive Committee, and Foundation BOD.
Row Cell (13,16) Valmont delivers three directorsto NU positions. Those positions art:
Dean of the College of Business, UN-LFoundation Consultant, and
Foundation Administxative Committee.
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Row Cell (14,16) Lincoln Telecommunications delivers five directors to NU positions.
Those positions are: Foundation Administrative Committee, Foundation Executive Committee, Foundation Consultant, Foundation Development Committee, and two Foundation BODS.
Row Cell (1 5,16) Crete Camer delivers a director to NU positions. Those positions are:
Foundation Administrative Committee, Foundation Executive Cummittee, and Foundation BOD.

These entries are displayed in Figure 7. The digraph in Figure 7 indicates the number of UDs (a UD being a person who is both a NU
official and a NCPC corporate director). Following the indication of the
number of UDs are the numbers that correspond to the person's name
in Appendix B. By adding NU to the NCPC matrix and digraph, the
substantial degree to which the University is corn& to the 15 core
corporations, and the extent of their director deliveries, become clear.
NU has more primary translocks than any other corporation in the matrix:there are 37 corporate officials involved in 11 primary translocks.
In comparison, FirsTier, as the highest ranking corporation in primary
translocks, has fewer the NU. FirsTier has 32 officials involved in 11
primary translocks. The highest number of primary locks between any
two institutionsoccurs between FirsTier and NU. There are 11. Excluding the University, the greatest number of PCTs between two corporations is 4. Of the 15 corporations that comprise the NCPC, 73 percent
deliver at least 1 director to NU. The NCPC also provides almost 50
percent of the directors to the University of Nebraska Foundation
Board of Directors, and holds 50 percent of the foundation committee
chairships.
The overlap articulated here between the NCPC and NU should not
be considered exhaustive. First, if documents that are not public could
be accessed, there may be additional direct exchanges. Second, if additional corporations, beyond those in the core, were included in the
matrix, additional connections between NU and the NCPC, through
~econdaryand tertiary connections, would be articulated Third, if
differentkinds of organizations, for example law firms, in addition to
business corporations were included in the matrix,additional reachability between the CPC and NU would be defined. An example is the
law firm of Cline, Williams, Wright,Johnson and Oldfather (Cline,
Williams). Its clients include NU and FirsTier Bank. In 1988-1989,
when Cline, Williams represented FirsTier and NU, Warren Johnson
fiom their law firmwas on the board of directors of FirsTier and also
served on the University of Nebraska Foundation board of directors.
Fourth, ifdifferent kinds of deliveries were included, additional over-
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laps would be spec8ed. Numerous examples come to mind in this category. For example, Kiewit Construction was the contractor for the
recently completed Durham lab science center at the University of
Nebraska-Omaha campus, and Kiewit is currently building the health
care facility at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. As another
example, ConAgra has delivered money and expertise to the University
of Nebraska-Lincoln for the establishment and purposes of the Agribusiness Program. The brochure for the Agribusiness Program states,
In 1981, ConAgra approached UN-L with the idea of an agribusinessprogram which would provide students with a sound background of both
business and agriculture knowledge and skills. ConAgra and UN-L set
goals for the program. C o w and the University Foundation committed five years of funding to give the program a sound start [Agribusiness
fiograml.

This statement clarifies that it was not UN-Lfaculty or administrators who initiated the idea. Beyond initiating the idea, ConAgra helped
set goals for the state university program. In addition, ConAgra, along
with the NCPC directors who dominate the University Foundation,
committed funding for the ~r0gra.m.~
ConchdingObsentmio~s

This article extends the conceptual and applied analysis on the overlap of organizations by using the Social Fabric Matrix.From this endeavor, our concluding observations are as follows.
First,the application of the SF'M extends the conceptuaI and applied
knowledge base on overlaps in a number of ways. It provides a method

for explicitly specifyingthe primary, secondary, and tertiary overlaps.
Thus, it allows for a more complete organization of data for analysis.
By using the SFM to ferret out these overlap sets, the large number of
secondary and tertiary translocks, not previously discovered, are specified
The SFM and its concomitant digraph allows for the description of
w
the decision network that Veblen thought was necessary for m
theoretical work to be completed. The SF'M digraph allows us to give
more precision to the concept of process; in this case, the decision process among corporations. By specifjing the decision network, the question with regard to the set of beliefs, myths, ideologies, and their legal
expressions that guide the process pattern presents itself perforce. For
policy purposes, the SFM must be expanded in the future to include
these entities.
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All systems experience hierarchical arrangements that have to be articulated for the system to be understood. The SFM approach allows
us to find the decision hierarchy by identifj.ingboth the central corporations and the reachability paths for information to be diffused from
those corporations. Too many corporate overlap studies have ignored
hierarchy and the central core corporations. By treating all corporations
the same (of equal importance), the findings in the studies lose validity.
For example, a number of studies have been completed on whether
broken ties between corporations are reconstituted with the same firm.
Most have ignored the hierarchy within the network by comparing total
ties to reconstituted ties. However, Linda Steams and Mark Mizuchi
found that reconstitution is a function of the corporation's power in
the network [Steams and Mizuchi 1986, p. 5361. Thus, distinctions
must be made with regard to a corporation's position in the hierarchy
before other distinctions can be tested. "All social systems-hence, all
organizations--exist in an institutional environment that defines and
delimits social reality. ...To neglect their presence and power is to ignore significant causal factors shaping organizational structures and
practices: to overlook these variables is to misspeGifL our causal models" [Scott 1987, pp. 507-81.
The SFM approach does not prejudge where the center lies. In Nebraska, the CPC included corporations involved in banking,insurance,
communications, food processing, equipment production, investment,
transportation, and so forth. The SFM method determines the central
core and the degree of reachability to the core, rather than forcinginvestigators to hypothesize the core.
Yngve Ramstad has stated that institutionalistknowlwe gains plausibility and validation as it is validated in different contexts [Ramstad
1986, pp. 1072-731. The findings in this article are a "real type." The
real type is the Nebraska context and the findings are consistent with
Munkirs's real type findings in the national context. This strengthens
the theory [Ramstad 1986, p. 10721. The next step, according to Ramstad, is to capture linkages and connections between the two contexts
in order to constitute the system's unity and wholeness. "These specific
linkages are what contribute to the system's uniqueness" [Ramstad
1986, p. 10721. This article uncovers how to begin sped& that linkage. The linkage between the national CPC and NCPC, it appears, is
accomplished by national and global corporations, such as IBP and
ConAgra, which are linked to both the national and local systems.
With regard to the relationship between a modem state university
and a state CPC,it is evident that the integration and overlap between
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the two is much more pervasive and complex than the simple relationship Veblen described as existing between governing boards and administrators early in this century. To correspond with Veblen's findings
for the private university, we might have expected the NCPC to have
overlapped extensively with the Board of Regents at NU. However, the
NCPC is not integrated into NU'S decisionmaking through NU'S
elected Board of Regents. Only one Regent held a position with a
NCPC corporation. He held a position with a subsidary of a NCPC
corporation. The integration of the NCPC and NU is accomplishedby
directors fiom NCPC corporations holding an extensive variety of decisionmaking positions at NU, they include Foundation committee
members, the University President, Chancellors of UN-Land UN-0,
Vice Chancellor, Athletic Director, Foundation Board of Directors,
and so forth. They are in positions to influence the major decisions
of the University. Corporate influence no longer obtrudes itselffrom
outside into the university. It has become internalized within the university as academic administrators become active participants in the
central planning core. Thus, the pecuniary logic now dominatesfrom
within the institution of higher learning. Whether this can be considered a general model, or just a specialNebraska case, will not be known
until similar research is completed in other states with other state universities.
The findings in Nebraska also make us rethink where the center of
the CPC may reside, especially at the regional level. Traditionally we
have not thought of such extensive integration as found in Nebraska
between the CPC and the university system. The Nebraska case may
be, as stated earlier, unique. If it is not, what are the d c a t i o n s on
a broader basis? To what extent does the corporate center reside in the
university? We saw fiom the data above that the NU system has more
primary overlaps with other corporations than FirsTier does. Thus,
NU is also a potential translock for corporate planning. In addition,
through NU the number of secondary and tertiary translocks among
NCPC corporations are vastly increased
The traditional statement about power is that power is dependent on
a combination of wealth, violence, and knowledge. We would probably
all find fault with the statement. For example, most of us would want
technology and organization to be included. Whatever the final set of
determinants of power we might agree upon, knowledge would be included. We also know that in a modem society, knowledge has become
more important than the other d e t e h t s . This means that a knowledge center such as the university will become of greater interest to any

78

F. Gregory Hayden and Kurt Stephenson

organization seeking power. Thus, we could surmise that the university
will become more integrated with the prominent core organbations of
society. The questions of how the university overlaps with any societal
institution it serves, and how a democracy can determine the answers
to those questions require that serious attention be given to organizational overlap.
Notes
1. The data base was c o l l d from public information sources. Those
sources are listed below. The data base is for 1988 and 1989. Information
from two years is included because the 1988-1989 data base best fits the
1988-1989 academic year at the University of Nebraska, and the finalconcern is with the relationship of the NCPC to the university. The sources
are: Electronic Yellow Pages. 1989. Dunn and Bradstreet; Standard and
Poor's Register of Corporations,Directors andExecutives. 1989. New York:
McGraw Hill: Vol 1; Annual Statements, Section D, 1988. Lincoh, State
of Nebraska, Insurance Department; Domestic Corporation Occupation
Tax Report. 1989. LincoIn: State of Nebraska, Office of the Secretary of
State; McFadden American Bank Directory* Nebraska. 1989. Nomss,
Ga.: McFadden Business Publications (Springx Million Dollar Directory:
America's Leading Public and Private Companies. 1989. Parsippany: Dunn
and Bradstreet Corp; and Compact Disclosure Version 3.7US. 1989. Bethesda, Md.: Disclosure Incorporated (January).
2. The computer disk is available tiom the authors.
3. Among the smaller banks deleted from consideration for the CPC,there
appears to be divided spheres of influence. There seem to be three distinct
groups. In the first group, one member of the board of FirsTier Financial
serves on the boards of Farmers State Bank and Trust-Aurora, First United
Bank-Neligh, Fanners State Bank and Trust-Lexington, First National
BanbWisner, and the Bank of Papillion. In a second group, one member
of the Board of First National of Nebraska serves on the board of Farmers
and Merchants-Bloomfield, Burt County Bank, Washington Bank, and
Harlan County Bank In the third group are members of the Acklie family.
They serve on the Boards of the Bank of Norfolk, Packers Bank and Trust,
and First National Bank of Lyons. Duane Acklie is also on the NCPC
boards of Crete Carrier, Ameritas Life Ins., and Lincoln Telecommunications.
4. A qualitative survey needs to be conducted in the future to validate which
weights are most appropriate.
5. Almost all of the NCPC members listed in Appendix B are non-Hispanic
caucasian male Republicans.
6. The required and recommended courses in the Agribusiness Program do
not include courses on (1) occupationalhealth and safety, (2) environmental protection and regulation, (3) or anti-trust regulation. Anyone with even
a newspaper acquaintance of the agribusiness industry knows those are
three of the major areas of concern in the industry.
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Appendix A
Glossary of Acronym Md Symbols

TCT
TDT

Centralized Private Sector Planning
Central Planning Core
Nebraska Central Planning Core
Primary Corporate Translock
Primary Director Translock
Secondary Corporate lianslock
Secondary DirectoI Translock
Tertiary Corporate lianslock
Tertiary Director Translock

SFM

Social Fabric Matrix

SFD
BOD
D

Social Fabric Digraph
Board of Directors
Member of a Board of Diredors
University Decision Maker
University Decision Maker Who Is Also a Director for a Corporation
University of Nebrsska (Entire System)
University of Nebraska-L'mcoln
University of Nebrasks-Omaha
Budget and Fiance Committee

CPSP
CPC
NCPC

rn

PDT
Scr
SDT

u

UD
NU

UN-L
UN-0
B&F

Appendix B
P e r s m Who Comprise the Nebraska Central P M r g Core (NCPC)Tramlacks
and Their Positions withNCPC Corporationsand NU, 1988--89
1. Abel George P.
2 Aclttie,Duane

3. Acklie. Phyllis
4. Bekins, FredrickM.

5. CaIhoun. David
6. Cate, Sydney
7. Cochran. John L
8. Conley, EugeneA.

9. Cook William w. Jr.

FirsTier Financial
Woodmen Acc. &Life
University of Nebraska
University of Nebraska
University of Nebraska
Amexitas Life Ins.
Crete Canier
Lincoln TelecommMications
CreteCanier
Union Bank &Trust
GuaranteeMutual Life
Norwest Nebraska
University of Nebraska
First Commerce Bancshares
University of Nebraska
Valmont
GuaranteeMutual Life
Norwest Nebraska
Norwest Nebraska
GuaranteeMutual Life
Ameritas Life
Lincoln Telecommunications

Director
Director
Fmdatioa Adm Comm
F m d a b Exec Colnm
Fmdation BOD

Director
I'res.. Director
Director
VP.Director
Director
Director
Fmdation Nom Comm
Fmdatioa Nom Comm

Director
Foundation Adm Comm

Director
Director
I'res., Director
Director
I'res., Director
Director
Director

Overlap of Organizations
Director
FirsTier Financial
Director
Peter Kiewit
Director
Valmont
Chrm, Director
First Cot.~lmerceBancshares Director
11. Devaney, Robert S.
University of Nebraska
Director
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
13. Faith, Marshall
Nomest Nebraska
Director
Lincoln Telecoll~nunications Director
14. Faulkner, Edwin J.
Woodmen Acc. & Life
Director
15. Fletcher, Philip B.
COnAgra
Resident
FirsTier FinanciaI
l)i~ector
Security Mutual
Director
16. Forke, Ted J.
First Commerce Banahares Director
Famrers Mutual
Pres.. Director
17. Frazier, Larry A
FirsTh Financial
Director
Foundation Adm Comm
University of Nebraska
18. Geist, James
Lincoln Telecommunications CEO, Director, Pres.
Norwest Nebraska
Director
19. Goebel, John W.
Vice Chancellor, UN-L
University of Nebraska
Lincoln Telmunications Director
20. Creer, J. Taylor
First Connnerce Bancshares Director
Security Mutual
Directar
Foundation Award Comm
University of Nebraska
21. Haessler, John
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
CEO, Director
Woodmen Acc &Life
FirsTier Financial
Dimtor
2 2 Harper, Charles M.
Wgra
~Director.CE0
Peter Kiewit
Director
Valrnont
Director
FirsTier Financial
Director
23. Heider. Chdes E
First Commerce Bancshares Director
24. Henning. Thomas E First Conrmerce Bancshares Vice President
Director
Security Mutual
First Colllmerce Bancshares Director
25. Holds Leland L.S.
Security Mutual
CEO. Director
Foundation Exec Comm
University of Nebraska
26. Johnson, Wanen
FirsTier Financial
Director
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
Foundation Award Comm
University of Nebraska
27. Klosterman, John
FirsTier Financial
Director
Ameritas Life
Director
28. Maddux. W. John
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
Foundation Award Comm
University of Nebraska
Foundation Adm Cotnm
University of Nebraska
29. Maenner, John R.
FirsTier Financial
Director
Director
30. Massengale, h1iutin Woodmen Acc. & Life
University of Nebraska
Chancellor, UN-L
University of Nebraska
Vice President
Cdgra
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31. Minnick, Gates
3 2 Nackerud,Narman
33. Olsson. John E
34. Osborne,Tom

35. Ostergad, Tonn M.
36. PaynqJohnW.

38. Perkina Dwight

39. Roskens. Ronald

40. Schorr.PaulD.,IIl
41. S c h w e n d i i Gary
42 Scott. Walter Jr.

43. Snibante. AJ.
44. Seward,Hany

45. Smith, William C.

46 Tekolste. Dale
47. Tistman. Date

University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
FirsTier Financial
Director
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
Foundation Dev Comm
University of Nebraska
FirsTier Financial
Director
First Commerce Bancshares Director
Norwest Nebraska
Director
Ameritas L i e
Director
First Commerce Bancshms Director
Security Mutual
Director
University of Nebraska
Head Football Coach, UN-L
CreteCarria
Vice President
Union Bank & 'Ziust
Dkcm
First Commenx Bancshares Director
Board of Regents
University of Nebraska
L i n c o l n T e l ~ c a t i o n s Director
First Commerce Bancshares Director
University of Nebraska
Foundation B&F Cornm
Fanners Mutual
Director
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
University of Nebraska
Foundation Exec Corn
University of Nebiaska
President
Director
Guarantee Mutual Life
Ameritas Life
Director
Lincdn Telecommunications Director
First CommerceBancshares Director
Dean. Col of Bus Adm, UN-L
University of Nebraska
V h t
Director
Berkshire Hathaway
Director
ConAgra
Director
FirsTim Financial
Director
Peter Kiewit
Pres.. Dir, Chrm
Valmont
Director
FirsTim Financial
Director
Guarantee Mutual Life
Director
Foundation Dev Cornm
University of Nebraska
Lincdn Telecommunications Director
FoundationExec Comm
University of Nebraska
Ameritas Life
Director
Farmers Mutual
Director
Firslier Financial
Director, CEO,Chrm
Lincoln Telemmmunications Director
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
Foundation B&F Comrn
University of Nebraska
Guarantee Mutnal Life
Director
Foundation Award C o r n
University of Nebraska
University of Nebraska
Foundation Exec Comm
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
Firslier Financial
Director
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Ameritas Life
C h m s ~ , C E O , ~
FirsTkr Financial
Director
49. Varner,Duaward B.
Lincoln T e l d c a t i m Director
ValmOnt
Director
University of Nebraska
Foundation Consultant
50. Weber, Del
NarwestBankNebraska
Directar
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
~ l l o rUN-0
,
University of Nebraska
Vice F'resident
University of Nebraska
51. Welsh, William F., I1 FirsTi Financial
Director
valmont
CEO,Dinctar
5 2 Whitehead. Milton
University of Nebraska
Foundation Exec C ~ m m
FirsTi Financial
Director
University of Nebraska
F d t i o n BOD
Foundation Nom Comm
University of Nebraska
53. Woods. Thomas C. JL FirsTk Financial
Director
Lincoln Tcleumununications Chnn, Director
Woodmen Acc & Life
Director
54. Yanney. Michael
University of Nebraska
Foundation BOD
FirsTi Financial
Director
Foundation Dev Comm
University of Nebraska
* '"This list of names corresponds to the tramlocks displayed in Figures 4.5.6, and 7.
'Ihese members m e on additional (non-core) boards. This list. however, includes d y
their membership on the 15 con corporations and the University of Nebraska."

ERRATUM

The following paragraphs were deleted from the printed version of F. Gregory Hayden and Kurt Stephenson, "Corporate
Transorganization and Veblen's Thesis on Higher Education,"
Journal of Economic Issues 26, no.1 (March 1992): 53-85. The
deleted paragraphs should follow the first paragraph under the
heading "Relevant Corporate Transorganizational Literature" on
page 56:
Fombrun, in 1986, stated that we needed to recognize t h a t
"structure is a complex construct whose disaggregation in extant
research has artificially compartmentalized complementary
aspects of organization." He believed that theories of structure
had artificially segregated various streams of organizational research. He stated that structure should be understood to be a configuration of infrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure.
"Thus within organizations, structure is a n edifice resting on the
intrastructural foundation of a technological solution to the
production problem, framed by a sociostructure of interactions,
around which crystallizes a set of superstructural norms and
values" [Fombrun 1986, 406; emphasis added]. Fombrun seemed
to be unaware of the works of Bert M. Evans and John R. Munkirs
that had already established corporate transorganizational approaches.
For years Professor Evans taught a t the University of Nebrask a that the economy of the United States is a corporate enterprise
economy and not a free enterprise economy. I t is an economy
which is planned a t the center, by what Fombrun referred to a s
the sociostructure corporations. According to Evans, that
sociostructure of large banks and insurance companies overlaps
with the production infrastructure to guide the producers a t the
national and the local levels.
One of Evans' professors a t Harvard, Edward H. Chamberlain,
developed the theory of monopolistic competition about which he
stated, in 1933, that most industries had evolved to a point that
they were dominated by a few firms. These firms, Chamberlain
stated, without overt collusion or organizational overlap, recognized their interdependence; and thus, in their pricing, production
and distribution policies, each corporation took into consideration
the reaction of others to its own decisions. Chamberlain indicated
I

that this system of mutual dependence recognized led to problems
such as monopoly pricing, unemployment, and economic waste
[Chamberlain 19621. Evans followed the lead of another of his
professors, John K Galbraith, who had found the corporate sector
in the U.S.to be planned [Galbraith 19671. In his own work, Evans
observed that the system had evolved beyond one of mutual dependence recognized to one of mutual advantage recognized a.rrangements among corporations. Corporations were no longer just
recognizing other corporations. They had evolved to a point of arranging for pervasive overlapping decision making and planning
for their mutual advantage. Evans referred to this a s a corporate
enterprise system, as opposed to the free enterprise system of an
earlier era. The corporate enterprise system "does not compete in
the old-fashioned economic sense. Rather the economic struggles
center, around strategies for control. . . ." [Evans 1980, 21. "It isn't
competition-it is the mutual adoption and standardization of
methods of avoiding the effects of competition" [1980,61.
Evans divided his explanation into two historical stages.
"Stage one became a matter of business stabilization through
mutual accommodation within the industrial family" 11980, 101.
These industrial families "shared markets and adopted product
and pricing patterns . . . " [1980, 71. Stage two of the corporate
enterprise system developed as overlapping arrangements across
industries acquired a larger share of the growing national product.
The multi-national, dominant core, shared monopoly groups. . .
looked a t each other and saw that in some cases one industrial' or
product line group or another received a bigger piece of the bigger
pie than themselves. It became apparent to these industrial or
business groups that it wasn't enough to protect themselves within
the group. Mutual advantage recognized arrangements worked
within the group; but each saw the need for a strategy to secure a
larger piece of the growing pie [1980,81.
According to Evans a central core, whose regular practices had
not solidified (although he believed that it was dominated by New
York banks and insurance companies) gave guidance to the system. Central core decisions emanate from the collective overlap of
numerous cores. "The dominant cores of the various multinational
industrial or business groups collectively have set the pattern and
mostly the rest of us try to survive" [1980,91.
All citations are to references listed in Hayden and Stephenson
[19921.
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